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FORUM
The Circle of Boys Market: A
Comment on Judicial
Inventiveness
James B. Atlesont
The author reexamines the Supreme Court's 1970 Boys Market opinion
which empowered federal courts to enjoin strikes in breach of collective
bargaining agreements. The author argues that Boys Market, while os-
tensibly grounded on neutral concerns for the integrity of state court juris-
diction and authority, in fact was based primarily on the Court's value
choice that there is no effective substitutefor an immediate halt to a strike.
The author concludes that the Court'sposition is not supported by legisla-
tive history and, indeed, conflicts with limitsplaced by Congress on federal
judicial policymaking in the area of labor injunctions.
This comment focuses on the continued unwillingness of courts to
restrain from judicial policymaking in the area of labor injunctions,
even in the face of a legislative enactment expressly designed to fetter
such judicial inventiveness. Historically the strike injunction has been
perhaps the most emotive act of state intervention into labor conflicts.
The judicial response in contemporary labor law, as under the common
law, often conceals valuation behind certain seemingly value-neutral
notions such as state-federal relations. Concern about the integrity of
state court jurisdiction was said to be the motivating force behind per-
mitting injunctions for breaches of collective agreements. But obfusca-
tion often returns to haunt the Court, and such a possibility is the
theme presented here.
In 1970 the Supreme Court held that federal courts could enjoin
strikes in breach of contract despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act's ban on
federal court injunctions in labor disputes. The Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, Local 770' decision required the overruling of
t Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author wishes to thank
Karl Klare, Eileen Silverstein, and Clyde Summers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. The errors herein, of course, should not be attributed to them except to the extent that
friendship should have motivated them to protect me from habitual excesses. I wish to thank
Virginia Seitz for her help in preparing this Article.
1. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson,2 decided only eight years earlier. Boys
Markets was overwhelmingly supported by academic writing for a vari-
ety of reasons. Many scholars agreed with the Court that the concerns
which motivated the Norris-LaGuardia Act3 were no longer present
since courts were no longer anti-union and unions were now strong and
established. Moreover, standards now existed to protect against judi-
cial abuses because the cases would involve breaches of written agree-
ments. Most importantly, perhaps, it was believed that injunctions
against strikes which violated no-strike promises were necessary for the
integrity of the arbitration process, which had received substantial judi-
cial attention and support.
The heart of the Boys Markets decision, however, seems to be a
concern for state authority which, due to the Supreme Court's own rul-
ings, had been effectively eliminated. When employers brought injunc-
tion actions against unions in state courts, based on the breach of an
express or a judicially created no-strike promise,4 unions would often
remove the dispute to federal court under federal question removal ju-
risdiction.5 The removal was perfectly proper since the substantive law
of collective agreements is "federal law, which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws."6
Decisions of the Supreme Court prior to Boys Markets had left
two important questions open. The first question was whether state
courts could enjoin strikes in breach of contract. Although the Norris-
LaGuardia Act barred federal courts from enjoining strikes, even those
in breach of an agreement, the Act expressly applied only to the federal
courts. If state courts could enjoin, however, a strange situation would
exist. State courts, required to apply federal substantive law because of
a desire for uniformity, could nevertheless enjoin strikes where federal
courts could not. This question would remain academic if unions
could routinely remove to federal court, at least in those cases in which
an injunction was not in the union's interest. But this led to the second
question: whether federal courts, after removal, were "required to dis-
solve any injunctive relief previously granted by the state courts."7 If
federal courts could not quash state injunctions, then removal would
not serve as a remedial strategy for unions. This result would both
maintain state power, by allowing state courts to grant an important
remedy barred from the arsenal of federal courts, while it would simul-
2. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
3. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
4. Eg., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
6. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 456
(1957).
7. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 244.
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taneously make states the primary, employer-preferred forum for these
actions. If, on the other hand, federal courts were required to quash,
then the right of state courts to enjoin strikes would not be a significant
question.8 In the late 1960s, there seemed to be a general consensus
that, after removal, a federal court was required to dissolve a previ-
ously-granted state court injunction.9
The Boys Markets majority relied on this situation to reconsider
and then overturn Sinclair. Prior cases, Justice Brennan said, "pro-
duced an anomalous situation,"'" to "oust state courts of jurisdiction in
§ 301(a) suits where injunctive relief is sought for breach of a no-strike
obligation" was "wholly inconsistent" with prior decisions which had
held that "§ 301(a) was to supplement, and not to encroach upon, the
pre-existing jurisdiction of the state courts."" Thus, even though
breach of contract cases could begin in state court, the fact that federal
courts could not grant such injunctions and would actually quash any
previously granted state court injunction encouraged employers to
bring injunctive actions in state court and motivated unions to seek
removal to federal courts.
It was not completely accurate for the Court to complain that sec-
tion 301, "the very provision that Congress clearly intended to provide
additional remedies for breach of collective-bargaining agreements, ' '
had been unaccountably employed to displace previously existing state
remedies. State jurisdiction still existed, but it is, of course, always sub-
ject to the appropriate use of the removal power. Indeed, after Boys
Markets unions can still remove to federal court, although removal no
longer serves the purpose of total avoidance of an injunction.' 3
8. 1 recognize that the state court injunction would be enforceable until the federal court
acted. See Lowden and Flaherty, Sympathy Strikes, Arbitration Policy, and the Enforceability of
No-Strike Agreements-An Analysis of Buffalo Forge, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 666 (1977).
The Supreme Court held in 1974 that a state temporary restraining order remains in effect after
removal but no longer than it would have remained in effect under the state's own law. Granny
Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 440 (1974). Moreover, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 65(b) sets a maximum life on such injunctions. This maximum term, measured
from the date of removal, limits the injunction's life to 10 days although this period can be ex-
tended to 20 days for good cause shown. If courts grant such an extension and are free to respect
(or powerless to alter) the 10 day period, then the state court's order may indeed be effective to
determine the dispute. 415 U.S. at 440.
9. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Local Union 191, 413 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated
398 U.S. 436 (1970).
10. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 244.
II. LId. at 244-45; Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 929
(1968). See, e.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
12. Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 245.
13. See Stein Printing Co. v. Atlanta Typographical Union No. 48, 329 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.
Ga. 1971) (dissolving state court injunction but issuing similar anti-strike injunction in accordance
with Boys Market requirements); Holland Constr. Co. v. International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, 315 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1970) (denying union's motion to dissolve state court injunction
but conditioning denial upon employer's willingness to arbitrate). See also Pullman, Inc. v. Inter-
[Vol. 7:88
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Moreover, despite the Court's professed concern for state court au-
thority (for it is really not state jurisdiction that is involved), the prob-
lem stems not from unions which tactically employed the removal
statute but from the Court's own decision in Lincoln Mills which pre-
empted state substantive law (but not state jurisdiction). The Court in
Lincoln Mills upheld the constitutionality of section 301 by finding that
the Act created a body of yet undetermined law which federal courts
would apply in breach of contract actions. This law, which must be
deemed a federal "common law," would be exclusively federal and
conflicting state law would be preempted. State law, the Court noted,
"will not be an independent source of private rights."' 4 Since removal
exists in section 301 cases before and after Boys Markets, the technical
scope of state jurisdiction remains unchanged by that decision. What is
altered, and it is certainly of critical importance, is that unions have
much less incentive to seek removal of state injunction proceedings
since federal courts may now also enjoin strikes. The battle, neverthe-
less, is less about state power than the availability of injunctions. Far
from involving an abstract dispute over federal-state relations and the
scope of state court judicial power, the central problem posed by Boys
Markets is whether, as a matter of public policy and statutory interpre-
tation, labor injunctions ought to be more freely available. It is simply
disingenuous for the Court to mourn the loss of state authority because
of the removal statute.' 5
Ironically, although state legislatures were presumably free to en-
act statutes enforcing collective agreements prior to section 301, few
did. Thus, it can be argued that state courts received an authority from
section 301 not provided by state legislatures. Thus, the effect of sec-
tion 301 was to foist upon some states, at least, an authority that may
national Bhd. of Boilermakers, 354 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (dissolving state court injunction
where collective bargaining agreement had terminated).
There seems to be no published empirical data revealing whether unions removed for other
reasons. Moreover, we do not seem to know whether the incidence of removal slackened after
Boys Markets. Many union attorneys believe that federal judges are often more hospitable to
unions than are state judges or at least that federal judges are more hospitable to the policies of
the NLRA.
14. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457.
15. Prior to the passage of § 301, the status of unions as unincorporated associations created
problems for litigants. This problem affected not the suability of unions but the accessibility of
union assets. H.R. MINORITY REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1947); bee also S. MINOR-
ITY REP. No. 105, Pt. 2, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 14-15 (1947). The minority reports attempt to
counter the allegations of the majority that the "laws of many States make it difficult to sue effec-
tively and to recover a judgment against an unincorporated labor union." S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1947). These contentions suggest that the desire to make agreements "enforce-
able", even no-strike promises, was primarily concerned with damages, not injunctions. Interest-
ingly, there is little if any comment about the ancient common law doctrine that promises to
arbitrate cannot be enforced.
19851
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL
not have been desired and that had not been provided by the state
legislature.
The legislative history of section 301 is singularly unhelpful in an-
swering critical questions although some assistance is provided. As the
Supreme Court noted accurately in Lincoln Mills, a primary and often
expressed concern of Congress was that "unions as well as employees
[sic) should be bound to collective bargaining contracts."' 6 There
clearly was a concern with no-strike promises and their enforcement.
After all, what sections of a collective bargaining agreement are unions
likely to violate? Indeed, although the discussion is noticeably vague,
the emphasis is probably far more directed to strikes which breach
agreements than to refusals to arbitrate. Both the Senate and the
House bills contain provisions which would have made the failure to
abide by an agreement to arbitrate an unfair labor practice.' 7 This fea-
ture was dropped by the conference committee because, the report
stated, "Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the
enforcement of this contract should be left to the usual processes of the
law and not to the National Labor Relations Board.""8
Legislative concern over the enforcement of no-strike promises is
clearly expressed:
If Unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution
of an agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief
advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective
labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the
term of the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring
freedom from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is
little reason why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to pro-
mote industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties, col-
lective agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable
in the Federal courts. Our amendment would provide for suits by un-
ions as legal entities and against unions as legal entities in the Federal
courts in disputes affecting commerce. 9
Such explicit references to the no-strike promise, as well as contin-
ual references that collective bargaining agreements should be made
16. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 453.
17. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, 23 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 21 (1947).
18. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1947). The phrase, "usual processes
of law," is sometimes meant to show congressional support for the use of injunctions, at least by
states, but the context makes it much less clear. The Conference committee seems merely to be
referring to the choice of judicial over administrative enforcement.
19. S. REP. No. 105, supra note 17, at 16.
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"equally binding and enforceable on both parties,"2 demonstrate the
desire to use the federal courts to enforce no-strike promises.
The Supreme Court acknowledged this congressional concern, and
stated in a famous phrase that "plainly the agreement to arbitrate
grievance disputes is the quidpro quo for an agreement not to strike.'
There was no evidence presented that such a trade had actually been
made, and the Court seems to have something in mind other than the
explicit bargaining of the parties. The functional purpose of this
phrase, I would suggest, is as follows: having already explained that
Congress wanted no-strike promises enforced, the Court then equated
the arbitration clause with the no-strike clause (assuming that a trade
had been made) in order to arrive at its ultimate conclusion in Lincoln
Mills that courts may enjoin the refusal to arbitrate. It is only later that
the quidpro quo language takes on a substantive meaning of its own.
None of this, however, clearly resolves the question at issue. It is
true that Congressperson Hartley, a sponsor of the bill in the House,
was asked by Congressperson Barden about the scope of the Act. He
stated his understanding, with which Hartley heartily agreed, that the
Act contemplates "not only the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also
such other remedial proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might be
appropriate in the circumstances,"22 giving as an example an action for
declaratory judgment. There is no suggestion here, of course, that the
Act modifies the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Indeed, the rejection of the
House bill which would have made the Norris-LaGuardia Act inappli-
cable to section 301,23 as well as the explicit modifications of section 6
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in section 301(e), would seem to go in
exactly the opposite direction.
Most of the references to the breaches of no-strike promises and to
the vagaries of state relief are consistent with the argument that the
primary focus was on damage actions. The majority reports in both
houses, for instance, stress that in some states union treasuries could
not be easily reached in breach of contract or other types of actions.
The problem of damages is also stressed in the House minority report,
which states:
Unions have never been exempt from suits because they are labor un-
ions. It has only been difficult to reach union assets because unions are
unincorporated associations. And even here, these difficulties have
been removed in the great majority of States. Actually, there are only
20. Id. at 15.
21. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 455.
22. 93 CONG. REC. 3,656-57 (1947).
23. The House report states that its bill made "the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable in
suits and proceedings involving violations of contracts. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 17, at 46.
This provision simply was not accepted by the Conference committee.
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13 States where union funds cannot be easily reached under laws in
effect permitting satisfaction of judgments from the central funds of the
union.
24
The subsequent Senate report also notes:
The laws of many states make it difficult to sue effectively and to re-
cover a judgment against an unincorporated labor union. It is difficult
to reach the funds of a union to satisfy a judgment against it. In some
States it is necessary to serve all the members before an action can be
maintained against the union.25
The Senate report also emphasizes that "only the assets of the union
can be attached to satisfy a money judgment against it; the property of
the individual members of the organization would not be subject to any
liability under such a judgment.'"26
The Senate report has one explicit reference to the Norris-La-
Guardia Act: it notes that the Act had insulated labor unions from
injunctions in cases of strikes and breach of contract. 27 Certainly Con-
gress was also aware that some activity was made non-enjoinable by
"little" Norris-LaGuardia Acts in some states. The report goes on to
note that no federal law existed which gave an employer any right of
action for breach of contract. This is one of the few references to in-
junctions, but there is no positive statement that the Norris-LaGuardia
Act will be abandoned in breach of contract actions. For example, im-
mediately following the quotation above is another reference to dam-
ages: "Even where unions are suable, the union funds may not be
reached for payment of damages and any judgments or decrees ren-
dered against the association as an entity may be unenforceable. 1 8 Af-
ter a description of the various types and extent of financial liability of
unincorporated associations in a variety of states, the Senate report
concludes that "[ilt is apparent that until all jurisdictions, and particu-
lar the Federal Government, authorize actions against labor unions as
legal entities, there will not be the mutual responsibility necessary to
vitalize collective-bargaining agreements.
' 29
The Conference report notes that section 302(e) of the House bill
made the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable in actions involving vio-
lations of agreements between employers and labor organizations. The
Conference bill, however, includes "only part" of this provision. This
24. H.R. MINORITY REP., supra note 15, at 108. The Senate minority also tried to overcome
what it considered to be the false impression of the majority that it is difficult to sue unions in state
courts. S. MINORITY REP. No. 105, Pt. 2, supra note 15, at 14-15.
25. S. MINORITY REP. No. 105, Pt. 2, supra note 15, at 15.
26. Id at 16.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id
29. Id
[Vol. 7:88
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refers to section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which provided a re-
strictive definition of a union's responsibility under agency principles.
This provision in the Norris-LaGuardia Act [section 6] was made inap-
plicable under the House Bill [but] Section 301(e) of the conference
agreement provides that for the purposes of Section 301 in determining
whether any person is acting as an agent of another so as to make such
other person responsible for his actions, the question of whether the
specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently rati-
fied shall not be controlling.3°
To all except a lawyer or judge, perhaps, the Conference report clearly
indicates that the passage of section 301 only modified section 6 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, dealing with the scope of union responsibility,
and did not make the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuar-
dia Act inapplicable to section 301 actions.
Thus, the overruling of Sinclair had to be based on policy consid-
erations despite legislative history. The locus of concern, as noted, was
said to be the loss of state authority caused by removal and Norris-
LaGuardia. The serious "problem" perceived by the Court in Boys
Market existed only if: (1) state courts, unlike federal courts, could en-
join strikes; and if, (2) federal courts, after removal, must quash any
state order. The Court simply assumed a positive answer to the first
and ignored the second. The argument for state power to enjoin was
not necessarily compelling. The Court's analysis, however, was based
on the premise that state courts indeed possessed the power to enjoin.
It is clear that state courts did assume the power to enjoin strikes prior
to Boys Market. In McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of
Carpenters,3 for instance, Justice Traynor of the California Supreme
Court perceptively foresaw the problem five years before the Court
faced Sinclair v. Atkinson. Even prior to decisions such as Charles Box
v. Dowd and Lucas Flour, Traynor decided (and accurately predicted)
that state courts have concurrent rights to enforce the federal rights
granted by section 301. He also predicted that state courts would be
required to apply federal law because otherwise the "scope of a liti-
gant's rights will depend on the accident of the forum in which the
action is brought. 32 Of course, the choice of forum is not always acci-
dental, especially if courts can give different remedies.
Traynor also believed, predicting the outcome of Atkinson v. Sin-
clair, that federal courts could not enjoin strikes in breach of a no-strike
clause.3 3 Yet, despite his concern for the "accidental" nature of a par-
30. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, supra note 18, at 66.
31. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d
322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
32. Id at 60, 315 P.2d at 330.
33. Id
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ticular forum, he held that state courts were not burdened by the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act. The basis for this conclusion, as in other similar
state court decisions, is a mixture of formal reasoning, ipse dixit and
issue begging. First, Traynor stated that it was not clear that Congress
could "compel a state court to withhold a remedy that could be avail-
able if the action arose under a contract law of the state."34 The breach
of contract action before the California state court, however, arose
technically under a federal statute, and that is why removal was always
a possibility. Indeed, section 301 was passed because of a perception
that effective enforcement of collective agreements in state courts ap-
peared problematic. The "litigant's rights" are federal, and whatever
remedial rights may previously have existed under state law must now
be viewed in the totally different situation created by the Lincoln Mills
decision.
Second, Traynor correctly noted that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
was explicitly designed to be a limitation on federal, not state, equitable
power. The issue, however, was whether Norris-LaGuardia was now
subsumed under the new federal common law of section 301. After all,
the Court in Lincoln Mills conceded that neither legislative history nor
section 301 details the federal law of collective agreements. That law,
in the words of Justice Douglas, is to be fashioned "from the policy of
our national labor laws."'35 The Court mentioned the NLRA as a pos-
sible, although unlikely, source of some answers and said that other
"problems will lie at the penumbra of express statutory mandates."'36
The Court did not mention any federal statute other than the NLRA,
yet it did go on to hold that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar an
injunction to enforce a party's promise to arbitrate. Thus, it is hardly
irrational to consider Norris-LaGuardia as part of the "penumbra of
express statutory mandates." There seems to be no other relevant fed-
eral statute, and case law since Lincoln Mills has not unearthed any
others.
Traynor's response was that there was no policy embedded in sec-
tion 301 which required state courts to withhold the injunctive rem-
edy.37 This leads to Traynor's strongest argument:
The principal purpose of section 301 was to facilitate the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements by making unions suable as
entities in the federal courts, and thereby to remedy the one-sided char-
acter of existing labor legislation . . . We would give altogether too
ironic a twist to this purpose if we held that the actual effect of the
legislation was to abolish in state courts equitable remedies that had
34. Id. at 61, 315 P.2d at 331.
35. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
36. Id at 457.
37. McCarroll, 49 Cal. 2d at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
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been available, and leave the employer in a worse position in respect to
the effective enforcement of his contract than he was before the enact-
ment of section 301.38
Employers would indeed be worse off in some sense if section 301
meant injunctions were no longer available in state courts. But the Act
also gave employers an action in federal court where none had previ-
ously existed, and Congress had stressed the procedural problems of
securing damages which existed in many states. Moreover, section 301
gave some states the legal basis for breach of contract actions against
unions where none had previously existed. Some states, generally
those more industrialized and, thus, more organized, had "little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts" which already barred injunctions in certain circum-
stances. Thus, the alternative result is less ironic than it might at first
appear to be. As the Court noted in Dowd, the "basic purpose of 301
was not to limit, but to expand, the availability of forums for the en-
forcement of contracts made by labor organizations."39 The emphasis
is on forums.
It is also quite possible that, as Clyde Summers has suggested,40
section 301 would most certainly not have passed if it had been made
clear that the provision would bar state court injunctions, thereby mak-
ing damages the exclusive remedy against union breaches of contract.
On the other hand, it is interesting that injunctions were not discussed
at all. Moreover, as already noted, the House bill would have made
Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable in all section 301 cases, but this provi-
sion was not accepted by the Conference committee. Norris-LaGuar-
dia was amended explicitly, but only in relation to the question of
agency.
In retrospect, one often feels that legislators would have balked at
explicit recognition of subsequent judicial creativity. In part this may
be due to the inability to foresee the actual results of one's handiwork.
The cause may also be the need to ignore emotional or devisive issues
in order to secure passage at all. One wonders what would have oc-
curred in 1947 if Congress had known that federal courts could not
enjoin strikes in section 301 cases in 1962, or that they subsequently
could in 1970. For that matter, what would have been the legislative
reaction in 1947 if a savant foretold the creation of federal common law
in Lincoln Mills which would lead to a broad presumption of arbi-
trability and limited judicial review of arbitration awards? 4' Placing a
38. Id at 63-4, 315 P.2d at 332.
39. Charles Dowd, 368 U.S. at 508-09.
40. Letter from Clyde Summers to James Atleson.
41. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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focus on what Congress would have done had they known what courts
would later do with their product lets courts off the hook for what they
in fact did do.
If states could enjoin, a strange terrain would be created in which
the strong federal interest in uniformity preempts state substantive law,
yet permits state courts, but not federal courts, to grant the most emo-
tion-laden (and effective) remedy in labor law. Putting the removal
issue to one side, would the presence of injunctive power in some states
upset the very urge for uniformity that preempted state law in the first
place? Traynor did not believe that uniformity was threatened because
"a state court can give a more complete and effective remedy. ' '42 The
effectiveness of the injunction is without question, but the problem of
uniformity cannot so easily be avoided. As Florian Bartosic argued in
1969, the problem can be illustrated by a hypothetical strike which oc-
curs in a number of states.43  Sinclair would have meant that injunc-
tions would have to be denied in each federal court in which such
actions were brought, while most (but not all) state courts would grant
such an injunction, even those which had anti-injunction statutes."
Although injunctions were overwhelmingly granted by state courts
both before and after Sinclair,45 the issue did not go unchallenged. In
McCarroll, Justice Carter argued in dissent that a state court was lim-
ited to federal remedies. He noted that the Supreme Court in Lincoln
Mills stressed that Congress had a "concern with a procedure for mak-
ing such agreements enforceable in the courts by either party." 46
Moreover, the Court had noted that section 301 provided the "neces-
sary legal remedies."47 Indeed, one of the issues in Lincoln Mills was
the question of remedy. Primarily, however, Carter argued that the
injunction is a crucial remedy, not a mere question of procedure.48
42. McCarroll, 49 Cal. 2d at 64; 332 P.2d at 332-33.
43. Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia Marine
on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 980, 1007-1008 (1969)."
44. Moreover, employers could seek an injunction in a state court yet sue for damages in
federal court. Bartosic, supra note 43, at 1008 & n.180.
45. Approximately 36 states, it is believed, provided injunctions for strikes in breach of con-
tract when Boys Market was decided. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 247 n. 15. Even after Sinclair,
Bartosic found that at least eleven states had enjoined strikes in breach of contract, four in the face
of anti-injunction statutes. The latter either rely upon a statutory exemption or, as in New York,
interpret such strikes as not constituting a labor dispute. Bartosic, supra note 43, at 1001, 1002
n.138.
46. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 453.
47. Id at 455.
48. See Fields, Injunctive Relief in State Courtsfor Breach of a No-Strike Clause, 2 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 122, 123-30 (1969). In Avco the Sixth Circuit held that removal could not be avoided
by framing the employer's right as a state right, thereby avoiding the effect of Sinclair. The
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, but failed to pass on the 6th Circuit's conclusions that
states had no power to enjoin in § 301 cases and, moreover, that federal courts were required to
dissolve state court injunctions after removal. 390 U.S. at 560 n.2, 561 n.4.
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McCarroll was cited with approval and without further analysis by
the Court in Boys Market. Also cited was Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW,4 9
which upheld state equitable power after Sinclair. Shaw, however, was
even more weakly reasoned. The Pennsylvania court noted, first, that
section 301 left the Norris-LaGuardia Act unchanged.5" Not only was
the question begged, but the court overlooked the Conference commit-
tee's rejection of the House bill which excluded the application of Nor-
ris-LaGuardia to section 301 actions. Second, the court quoted the
statement that the enforcement of section 301 would be left to the
"usual processes of law,"'" a statement, however, which was designed
only to explain why the Conference rejected the Senate bill's provision
making a breach of contract an unfair labor practice. Finally, the
Pennsylvania court recognized the problem of uniformity but assumed
that this concern applied only to the interpretation of the substantive
provisions of the agreement.5 2
It certainly can not be said that injunctions against strikes are pe-
ripheral to the federal concerns in labor relations or to the law of col-
lective agreements. In addition, injunctions can hardly be deemed
"procedural" matters which are not within the scope of federal preemp-
tion. Indeed, there is a stronger argument for the opposite position.
Those other federal laws from which the Court would devise the law of
section 301 would have to include the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Since
the Supreme Court empowered itself to create section 301 law, it could
easily hold as a matter of federal law that the strictures of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act had become part of the law of section 301 and, thus,
binding on the states.
Such a conclusion flows from the importance of the injunction in
American labor history as much as from the continued willingness of
courts to believe that strike injunctions merely hold the "status quo"
rather than realistically determine the dispute. As Professor Aaron has
stated, it has been
noted by all competent students of industrial relations, that in labor
disputes the injunction remedy is inextricably linked with the rights of
the parties involved; a strike may be won or lost, depending upon
whether the employer's application for a temporary injunction or a
temporary restraining order succeeds or fails . ..."
The purpose of Norris-LaGuardia, to restrain the issuance of injunc-
49. Shaw Electric Co. v. IBEW, 418 Pa. 1, 208 A.2d 769 (1965).
50. Id at 9, 208 A.2d at 773.
51. Id
52. Id. at 10-11, 208 A.2d 774-75.
53. Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 at 1035-36
(1963). See also Gregory, The Law of Collective Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 635 at 652-3
(1959); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress d State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 6 at 279-80 (1959).
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tions in "justifiable" as well as unjustifiable situations, obviously ap-
plies to state courts as well as federal courts. The zeal of state courts is
no more apparent than in New York where what appears to be a strict
anti-injunction statute is routinely finessed, for instance, by holding
that a breach of contract strike does not constitute a "labor dispute."54
The fear of judicial abuse is clearly present. Professor Aaron
found that a judge will typically
entertain the application in an ex-parte proceeding, possibly on the ba-
sis of affidavits and argument, without testimony. It is safe to assume
that in most instances he will have only slight familiarity, if any, with
industrial relations practice; and frequently, he will have only a meager
knowledge of labor law. Add to these disadvantages a crowded docket
prompting a perfectly natural desire to get rid of the case, and it be-
comes apparent that there is little chance that the judge will probe
deeply enough beneath the plaintiffs allegations and the defendant's
answers and become sufficiently well informed about the case to reach
a reasonable judgment concerning the need for a restraining order. 55
The Supreme Court in Boys Market assumed that state courts
could enjoin and, apparently, that federal courts upon removal were
obliged to quash those injunctions. It is only with these assumptions
that the Court could say that the federal policy of uniformity was
threatened by the existing state of the law. Some lack of uniformity, it
was forced to recognize, stems from having more than one court and,
indeed, from the Court's holding that states had concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts. More humorously, the very problem the Court was
really concerned with was a disturbing uniformity, that is, after removal,
federal courts routinely quashed state court injunctions. And, said the
Court, recognizing the great importance of the injunction as a "reme-
dial device," its "availability or nonavailability in various courts will
not only produce rampant forum shopping and maneuvering from one
court to another but will also greatly frustrate any relative uniformity
in the enforcement of arbitration agreements."56 Again, of course, the
majority was not really concerned with either forum-shopping or the
lack of uniformity for existing law created a practical kind of uniform-
ity as well as a reduced need for forum-shopping.57
54. See Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc.2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1963), ar'd23
App. Div.2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965); Williams Press, Inc. v. Albany Printing Pressmen, 55
Misc.2d 452, 285 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1967); Thaddeus Suski Productions v. Vola, 47 Misc.2d 773, 263
N.Y.S.2d 275 (1965). For other states adopting similar interpretations see Bartosic, supra note 43,
at 1002, n.136.
55. Aaron, Labor InJinctions in the State Courts, 50 VA. L. REV. 951, 1157 (1964).
56. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 246.
57. Another argument was that the removal procedure was never designed to "foreclose
completely remedies otherwise available in the state courts." Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 246.
Again, the concern assumes state court power to enjoin. Of course, the removal procedure is still
open to respondents even after Boys Market.
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Justice Brennan did acknowledge that these "objections" could
just as easily be remedied by applying Norris-LaGuardia to the states
as they could by overruling Sinclair. This possibility, however, was
easily dismissed by quoting Justice Traynor to the effect that
"[wihether or not Congress could deprive state courts of the power to
give such [injunctive] remedies when enforcing collective bargaining
agreements, it has not attempted to do so. . ... 58 So much for this
possible resolution.
The conclusion seems clear, especially in an opinion written by
Justice Brennan, that something else must be at stake than the interest
in uniformity. Indeed, relying on the "quid pro quo" notion, Brennan
stated that Sinclair has "devastating implications for the enforceability
of arbitration agreements and their accompanying no-strike obligations
.... "59 The Court's belief that no-strike promises must be enforced
by injunction lies at the heart of Boys Market. It should be noted that
Brennan was saying that Sinclair, in deferring to a congressional stat-
ute, would upset the judicially created policies of the Court in section
301 cases. Unions promise to arbitrate disputes, yet such a promise
does not necessarily mean they foreswear self-help over these matters.
Yet, the Court has relied upon this very assumption. When there is an
explicit no-strike clause, as in Boys Market, is an injunction necessary
to protect the employer's bargain? Interestingly, this argument is made
by the majority in Boys Market and the dissent in the later Buffalo
Forge decision.6"
But what is the bargain? The union in Boys Market indeed prom-
ised not to strike and the breach of this promise could lead to a damage
award. Moreover, employees who strike are subject to discharge be-
cause a strike which violates a no-strike promise is considered unpro-
tected. But surely the particular parties involved in Boys Market did
not assume that injunctions were available to enforce their no-strike
clause since the Court had made it clear in 1962 that federal courts, at
least, could not issue such injunctions. Injunctions, as an equitable
remedy, were in a real sense extraneous to the "bargain" before the
Court in Boys Market. That the union promised not to strike in the
absence of an injunctive remedy is no more odd than the fact that prior
to section 301 even damages could often not be obtained for a breach
of a collective agreement. And since, as the Court continually reminds
us, collective agreements should not be treated as normal contracts, the
absence of the full panoply of normal remedies should not be shocking.
A "voluntary" promise not to strike, like any promise, may be enforced
58. McCarroll, 49 Cal. 2d at 63, 315 P.2d at 332.
59. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 247.
60. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
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in a variety of ways, but the available legal remedies are a matter of
public determination.
Brennan also relies upon the standard argument in section 301
cases: the availability of injunctive remedies is required to encourage
employers to agree to arbitration clauses.6 1 More puzzling is the evi-
dence, surely made available to the Court, that arbitration had gained
wide acceptance, even during the period when Sinclair prevented strike
injunctions. The incidence increased steadily since 1945 so that in
1964, two years after Sinclair barred injunctions as a remedy, the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics found that 94% of agreements studied con-
tained arbitration clauses.62 Indeed, the inclusion of arbitration clauses
had grown after Sinclair!
Boys Market, therefore, seems to be based primarily on the Court's
belief that there is no substitute for an immediate halt to an unjustifi-
able strike and that damages are an ineffective deterrent. That injunc-
tions are the most effective means to end a strike has long been known,
even in 1930 when the Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted. The in-
junction is the most effective remedy for the employer, although the
Court's holding rests upon its stated belief that such a result is neces-
sary to defend the integrity of arbitration agreements.
It is sometimes said that strikes are inconsistent with arbitration
either because strikes are inconsistent with the Union's promise to arbi-
trate, which assumes the answer, or because strikes place pressure upon
the arbitrator.63 Although most arbitrators strongly support Boys Mar-
ket, I know of none who would assert that his or her decision would be
affected by the existence of a strike. This does not mean, of course, that
arbitrators are not affected or that a strike may not force an employer
to concede an issue upon which it could prevail in arbitration. This
concern about the enforceability of rights is surely commendable, but it
occurs in an area where, for instance, unions commonly challenge em-
ployer actions in arbitration, a process whose long resolution time may
nullify any union victory, and which evinces little concern for the en-
forceability of employee and union rights in non-arbitration contexts. 6
It is true that a strike could force an employer to alter the criticized
behavior, behavior which would be the focus of arbitration and which
might be determined contractually proper. Perhaps this concern lies
61. Although it is often the employer who objects to the inclusion of such a clause, primarily
because of a fear of a loss of control rather than the unavailability of enforcement remedies, the
notion assumes that only unions have a positive interest in arbitration clauses. The Court also
assumes that only employers have an interest in obtaining a no-strike clause.
62. BLS Bull. No. 1425-1, Grievance Procedures, p. I (1964).
63. See Amalgamated Trans. U. Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.
1977) (presumption that arbitration process will be significantly impaired by strike but not by
employer breach).
64. See J. ATLESON, VALUES AND AssUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983).
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behind Boys Market. It is a view which opts for a certain type of dis-
pute resolution, perhaps one more "middle class" than "working class."
Yet, the threat of economic pressure or resistance constantly affects the
behavior of unions and employers.65 The arbitration process, after all,
is part of the collective bargaining process, a process which the Court
has told us involves both good faith bargaining and the presence of
weapons. Thus, a union may bargain in good faith even if concurrently
it is engaging in an unprotected slowdown. 66 The Boys Marke"
marjority must assume that although weapons are "part and parcel" of
the bargaining process, arbitration, although clearly part of the same
process, must be treated differently when economic pressure is in-
volved.6 7 Indeed, much of labor law distinguishes between the making
of contracts and the enforcement of contracts. The use of self-help is
apparently proper only in the former situation.
The circle of Boys Market arises from its recent clarification in
Buffalo Forge6 8 that only strikes over arbitrable matters may be en-
joined under section 301. That is, injunctions are proper only where
the underlying dispute is arbitrable. Other strikes may not be enjoined
because of the enduring vigor of Norris-LaGuardia. If the underlying
dispute cannot be resolved by arbitration, no injunction can be ob-
tained because the collective action does not threaten the arbitral sys-
tem. Thus, a sympathy action could not be enjoined even though the
strike itself may be in violation of a contractual no-strike promise. The
Court's holding stressed that Boys Market was based on a clear policy
of barring strikes which would "frustrate the arbitral processes
.... 69 In other cases, the Norris-LaGuardia Act still applies to re-
strict federal judicial power.7 °
Buffalo Forge also raises the common question of who is to bear
65. This objection assumes the employers' right to proceed on a course which is permitted by
the agreement without having to face employee pressure. Without a no-strike promise, however,
there is no suggestion that section 7's right to strike may only be employed against unlawful or
otherwise objectionable behavior. From the reverse perspective, most of labor'r statutory rights
can be substantially restricted by employer counter action. Thus, the employer can permanently
replace strikers or can preempt the strike by a lockout.
66. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
67. Of course, the Court has conceded that it would recognize, although reluctantly, a clause
which explicitly granted the Union the right to strike over arbitrable matters. See Gateway Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974). See also Atleson, Threats to Health and
Safety: Employee Self-Help Under the NLkA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975); Atleson, Work Group
Behavior and Functions of Industrial Disobediance, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 751 (1973).
68. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
69. Id at 407.
70. The 4-judge dissent argued that only part of the quidpro quo was now enforceable, an
argument which assumes more about the intentions of the parties than the record usually shows in
these cases. Id at 413. See also Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshore-
men's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982) (work stoppage for political reasons held not enjoinable).
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the costs of delay and the risk of judicial error." If no injunction can
be granted, and an arbitrator subsequently holds that the strike consti-
tuted a breach of the agreement, then the employer has suffered the
kind of intervening harm the Court would prefer it had not. But the
reverse cost is often ignored. If the arbitrator after an injunction is
granted decides that the strike did not violate the agreement, that is, the
strike did not violate the union's no-strike promise, then activity has
been wrongfully enjoined. This risk is common yet it surely is deeply
implicated in the policies of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 2 The problem
in 1930, and to an undetermined extent now, is that many judges still
feel that injunctions only hold the status quo and do not resolve the
merits.7 3 It is true that employer decisions may be overturned in arbi-
tration, so the problem of an injunction's effect on the outcome of a
dispute is less severe than in non-contractual contexts, but the costs of
error are still present.
With this long prologue we can now turn to the problem. Suppose
an injunctive proceeding is begun in state court and, for some reason, is
not removed to federal court. Assume further that the strike is not over
an arbitrable grievance and, thus, a federal court could not enjoin the
activity given Buffalo Forge. May the state court enjoin because Nor-
ris-LaGuardia is not applicable to state courts?74 If it can, then the
very same problems which seemingly bedeviled Brennan in Boys Mar-
ket reappear because unions will remove to federal court to avoid the
broader state injunctive power.7 5 In other words, the existence of a po-
tentially broader zone for injunctive action in state courts recreates the
"problems" allegedly thought so serious in Boys Market. If, on the
71. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436
U.S. 180 (1978), where the majority stressed the inability of employers to test the "arguably pro-
tected" side of the Garmon preemption standard while ignoring the risks to federally protected
interests caused by state court action.
72. By a process similar to that used in Sears, the Court could finesse this potential cost by
assuming that most midterm strikes breach the agreement.
73. See, one painfully must cite, F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
74. This hypothetical could be stated in a somewhat reverse fashion. Assume an employee
seeks an injunction against an alleged breach of a no-strike clause in a state which has a "little"
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The union's defense relies primarily upon the state's statutory restrictions
on the granting of injunctions. The employer relies upon § 301, arguing that 301 and its remedies
(including the judicial narrowing of Norris-LaGuardia) supercede state law. If the court holds
steadfast to state law, then state remedial power even after Boys Market could ironically be nar-
rower than that available in a federal court. If the employer succeeds, on the other hand, on the
theory that the federal common law of collective bargaining agreements applies to state courts,
then § 301 has broadened the remedies available under the state's own law.
75. See Sheet Metal Workers v. Seay, 693 F.2d 1000 (10th Cir. 1982), modified and reh'g
denied, 696 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1983), where the court, relying on Avco Corp., refused to remand to
a state court after removal because of the employer's argument that the federal court could not
enjoin after Buffalo Forge. The problem was noted by Justice Stevens in his Buffalo Forge dissent,
428 U.S. at 423 (1976). See also Fields, supra note 48, at 122.
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other hand, the state court cannot enjoin, then it must be because the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, even as narrowed by the Court in section 301
cases, has substantively become part of section 301 law and, as such, is
binding on state courts. 7 6 Yet this is the very proposition rejected by
the Court in Boys Market.
Should the hypothetical case arise, either state courts can give a
wider range of injunctions than can federal courts, leading back to the
removal "problem" stressed by the Boys Market majority, or state
courts cannot enjoin because Norris-LaGuardia is read as part of the
developing federal common law of section 301.77 The situation high-
lights the problems caused by masking value choices in cases like Boys
Market. If the problem of protecting state power was truly significant,
the Court could either apply the Buffalo Forge doctrine to the states,
thereby creating federal-state uniformity, or it could overrule Buffalo
Forge, creating a different kind of uniformity. The first option was re-
jected in Boys Market because of expressed concern for state auton-
omy, and its subsequent rejection would help unmask the valuation in
Boys Market. Yet, the concern expressed in Buffalo Forge about the
costs of judicial intervention and substantive effects of even temporary
injunctions surely militates against permitting state courts a wider
range of intervention than federal courts possess.
It is surely possible that the current Court will overturn Buffalo
Forge, making injunctions available for breaches of no-strike promises
even if the strikes are not caused by arbitral issues. As the critics of
Buffalo Forge have argued, Norris-LaGuardia does not distinguish be-
tween strikes in response to arbitrable grievances and strikes in re-
sponse to nonarbitrable grievances. If uniformity is deemed more
important than the protection of state power, the Court could do noth-
ing, for unions would simply remove this type of state injunctive action
to federal court. The hypothetical problem, therefore, creates the same
set of issues presented by Boys Market.
Given the volume of published criticism of the Buffalo Forge deci-
sion, I wish merely to suggest that much of the existing problem stems
from the shaky doctrinal foundation of Boys Market. Admittedly, Boys
Market is certainly a logical result of the process which began in Lin-
coln Mills and was fleshed out in the famous arbitration trilogy. It is
76. I understand that there is a difference between barring all injunctions and restricting, but
not totally preventing, the issuance of an injunction. In a Buffalo Forge type case, however, the
difference vanishes. Moreover, the effect on state authority would be the same because unions will
exercise their right to remove to federal court.
77. The Court could also hold that federal courts may not quash a state injunction even
though the federal court could not initially have granted an injunction. The Court's failure to deal
with this in Boys Market suggests that the issue is not a difficult one to resolve. Moreover, this
result would encourage forum shopping since employers would seek injunctions in state courts
rather than federal courts. This result would obtain if state courts had a broader equitable power.
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also true that unions generally agree to no-strike promises, but they do
not necessarily agree thereby to waive the protection of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act. Buffalo Forge's unintentional creation of the same state-
federal problem allegedly disturbing the Court in Boys Market high-
lights the fictitiousness of the doctrinal argument in Boys Market. Even
more serious is the reliance upon judge-made law to undercut statutes,
especially those designed to avoid judicial excesses.78 It is also possible
to avoid the problem raised here, as Judge Traynor did in McCarroll,
by stressing that section 301 was designed to supplement state jurisdic-
tion. Yet, hardly anything the Court has done in interpreting section
301, from Lincoln Mills onward, was based on congressional guidance
of any kind. It is this kind of free-wheeling judicial policymaking, and
not legislative intent, which explains Boys Market.
The Court could, of course, overturn Buffalo Forge,79 but to do so
it would have to jettison what I believe is the doctrinal basis of the
section 301 cases. The key seems to be that the arbitration clause is
being enforced, not the no-strike clause. To "imply" (as in Lucas
Flour) a no-strike promise concurrent with an arbitration clause only
means that the Court assumes that a union which promises to arbitrate
also promises to deal with those matters in no other way. Thus, the
absence of a no-strike promise in Gateway Coal, for instance, is
irrelevant.8 °
Professor Summers has argued that the connection of the injunc-
tion to the arbitration process in Boys Market was artifical.8' In the
absence of arbitration, contractual disputes would be decided by a
court, and a strike would equally frustrate the judicial process or the
arbitration process. My problem is understanding hew a strike neces-
sarily frustrates either process, but if this argument is accepted, then
Boys Market is correct in result and Buffalo Forge is wrong.
To enjoin a strike pending arbitration, however, would force the
Court to consider Boys Market-type injunctions against employers.82
These injunctions, granted to stay employer actions pending arbitra-
tion, were granted by lower courts after Boys Market but are now more
78. For a similar area of concern, see Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration & NLRB
Deference 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 355 (1971).
79. Buffalo Forge was a 5-4 case, and given the support of much academic criticism, it is not
inconceivable that the decision, although fairly recent, will be reversed. The two most likely de-
partures from the Court, however, Brennan and Marshall, were dissenters in Buffalo Forge.
At least three, perhaps four, members of the current court oppose Buffalo Forge. See Jack-
sonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. ILA, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
80. See Atleson, Threats to Health and Safety. Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59
MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975).
81. Letter from Clyde Summers to James Atleson.
82. See generally, Cantor, Buffalo Forge and Injunctions Against Employer Breaches of Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements, 1980 Wis. L. REV. 247; Gould, On Labor Injunctions Pending Arbi-
tration: Recasting Buffalo Forge, 30 STAN. L. REV. 533 (1978).
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difficult to obtain after Buffalo Forge. To bar employer actions which
alter working conditions pending arbitration would, of course, greatly
protect the "integrity" of arbitration provisions.8 3  And it would also
presume a mutual relationship, invoking a more equal participatory re-
lationship than the Court has thus far been willing to countenance.
84
Indeed, the broad presumption that all disputes are arbitrable unless
exceptions are clear, a presumption which already constrains employ-
ers in arbitrability disputes, would seriously limit employer freedom to
act unilaterally. This surprise cost of the Trilogy to employers would
bedevil employers just as the quidpro quo notion affects unions by
viewing no-strike promises to be at least as broad as arbitration
clauses.85 One result of the Court's quidpro quo notion, then, is that it
may be faced with an issue which directly confronts the unequal rela-
tionship which the law itself has helped to create.
86
Because of the Court's primary concern with the arbitration
83. "[Tlhe courts have extended the Boys Market exception to embrace employer behavior
which has the effect of evading a duty to arbitrate or which would otherwise undermine the integ-
rity of the arbitral process." Aluminum Workers Union Local No. 215 v. Consolidated Aluminum
Corp., 696 F.2d 437, 441 (1982). The post-Boys Market decisions generally agreed upon the crite-
ria for determining the propriety of a union's status-quo request. Unlike the strike injunction
situation, however, the crucial factor is whether injunctive relief is necessary to protect the arbitra-
tion process itself. Thus, an injunction would be appropriate where an employer's action prior to
an arbitrator's ruling would have the effect of "rendering the arbitral process a hollow formality
. . . where, as here, the arbitral award when rendered could not return the parties substantially to
the status quo ante." Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 123 (4th Cir.
1976).
Injunctions have been granted where employers intended to implement major changes which
would present the arbitrator with an irreversable situation. Thus, injunctions have been granted
where an employer intended to close a plant and move production to another location, Lever Bros,
id.; close a part of an operation, Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. S.B. Thonias, Inc., 99 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2253 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); or liquidate assets when pending grievances existed involving poten-
tial monetary liability. Teamsters Local 71 v. Aker Motor Lines, Inc., 582 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979).
84. Eileen Silverstein has perceptively noted that this view of quidpro quo notion may focus
upon the least significant aspect of the union-employer relationship. Since the union has under
§ 7 only the right to strike over mandatory subjects of bargaining, the no-strike promise waives
only the right to strike over such subjects. Thus, the "reciprocal obligation to use arbitration never
contemplates arbitration over 'entreprenurial' decisions." Letter to author. There is a difference,
of course, between the scope of § 7 and the scope of a no-strike promise, especially since a breach
of such a promise can lead to damages even if the activity is also unprotected by the NLRA. It is
accurate, however, to stress that both the scope of bargaining and § 7 have been limited so as not
to interfere with managerial freedom. See generaly J. ATLESON, VALUES & AssUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 64, especially chapter 3, 5 and 7. Thus, the quidpro quo
notion assumes a particular approach to certain types of disputes, but the notion exists in a larger
context which assumes an already seriously unequal relationship.
85. The basic assumption in arbitral law is that the employer acts and arbitration is available
to question that action. The analogous situation under § 301 would be that the reverse Boys Mar-
ket injunctions would presumably not be readily available unless the integrity of the arbitration
process is threatened.
86. See Lynd, Investment Decisions & the Quid Pro Quo Myth, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 396
(1979); Stone, The Post War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981).
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clause, Buffalo Forge is more consistent with the post-Lincoln Mills rul-
ings than its critics are willing to assume. In any event, the weaknesses
of that decision should not deflect attention from Boys Market itself, a
decision whose analysis may return to haunt the Court. The story,
which could be retold repeatedly with respect to various episodes in
American labor law, reveals the costs of judicial inventiveness un-
guided by legislative enactments. This problem is especially serious
when the creation of legal rules based on judicially ordained values
results in the modification of a statute designed precisely to restrict ju-
dicial policymaking.
